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Note 
It’s All Relative: Familial DNA Testing and the 
Fourth Amendment 
Amanda Pattock* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1985, the streets of Los Angeles, California, were 
plagued by several serial killers.1 Among the most brutal was a 
man coined the “Grim Sleeper.”2 The Grim Sleeper picked up 
prostitutes whom he raped and then violently murdered by 
shooting or strangulation.3 Between the years of 1985 and 
1988, the Grim Sleeper attacked and murdered eight known 
victims.4 At the end of 1988, the only victim known to survive 
the attack came forward.5 After the surviving victim came 
© 2011 Amanda Pattock. 
* Amanda Pattock is a December 2011 J.D. candidate at the University of 
Minnesota Law School. She received her B.A. in 2009 from the University of 
Michigan with majors in Sociology and English. After law school Amanda will 
be moving to Austin, Texas where she will take the bar exam. 
 1. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Rebecca Cathcart, In Los Angeles, 
Unsolved Serial Killings Reflected Era, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 19, 2010, at A11 
(describing the spate of violent serial killings in Los Angeles during the 
1980s). 
 2. Greg Miller, Scientists Explain how Familial DNA Testing Nabbed 
Alleged Serial Killer, SCI. INSIDER (July 12, 2010, 1:18 PM) 
http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/07/scientists-explain-how-
familial.html. 
 3. Steinhauer & Cathcart, supra note 1. 
 4. Sarah Ardalani, Map: Grim Sleeper Killings, 1985-2007, L.A. TIMES, 
http://projects.latimes.com/homicide/list/grim-sleeper-killings/ (last visited 
Apr. 16. 2011) (providing a map listing the Grim Sleeper’s victims by date and 
other statistics). 
 5. Steinhauer & Cathcart, supra note 1 (describing the experience of a 
woman, Enietra Washington, who was shot, sexually assaulted, and 
photographed before being pushed into the street and survived to give police 
details that fit with previous murders). 
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forward, the Grim Sleeper took a fourteen year hiatus.6 
However, in 2002 the Grim Sleeper struck again, and from 
2002 until 2007, three additional victims were identified.7 
On July 7, 2010—fifteen years after the attacks began—
police finally arrested the Grim Sleeper.8 Unable to locate him 
using traditional means of identification, the police turned to a 
relatively new technology: familial Deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) testing.9 Using DNA from the victims, police identified a 
partial DNA match.10 The match belonged to Christopher 
Franklin, a young adult convicted of a felony weapons charge 
one year prior.11 At the time of the first murders, Christopher 
was not yet born, so detectives looked instead to male family 
members that would have been appropriately aged at the time 
of the murders.12 Using this line of inquiry, the police identified 
Christopher’s father, Lonnie Franklin Jr., as the most likely 
suspect.13 Law enforcement officials then collected a discarded 
piece of pizza from Lonnie Franklin Jr.’s trash and confirmed 
that his DNA was a full match to the DNA found on the 
victim.14 After twenty-five years and eleven murders, the killer 
was finally caught.15 
Familial DNA testing has been hotly contested across the 
country, but its usefulness in helping law enforcement officials 
catch and prosecute criminals is well established.16 This Note 
argues that the benefits of familial DNA testing outweigh any 
invasion of privacy rights, specifically with regard to the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unwarranted search 
and seizure. Part II first explores what DNA is, how it is used 
 6. Id. (noting that the 14 year hiatus from killing led to Franklin being 
coined the Grim Sleeper” due, according to one theory, to the fact that the final 
victim’s survival spooked the killer into hiding). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Miller, supra note 2. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. (noting that the DNA search combined with the dates of the 
murder led police to the father). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Ardalani et al., supra note 4. 
 16. See Jennifer Steinhauer, ‘Grim Sleeper’ Arrest Fans Debate on DNA 
Use, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2010, at A14 (noting that police and district attorney’s 
call the practice “essential” to catching elusive criminals). 
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to identify individuals, and how DNA is stored. Then, a 
definition of familial DNA testing and a brief overview of 
current legislation pertaining to familial DNA testing follows. 
The final portion of Part II discusses challenges against DNA 
collection under the Fourth Amendment. Part III applies a 
Fourth Amendment analysis to familial DNA searching, and 
concludes with suggestions for limiting the way in which 
familial DNA is conducted. This Note ultimately concludes that 
familial DNA testing is constitutional and, as a policy matter, 
provides benefits to society that outweigh any potential 
intrusion of individual’s privacy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A THE MAKINGS OF GOOD GENES: DNA 
In order to fully understand the mechanics and 
implications of familial DNA testing on individual’s privacy 
rights, it is essential to understand what DNA is, how it is 
created, and how it is used as an identifying tool. The following 
is a brief overview of the mechanics of DNA, and an 
explanation of how DNA is used to identify individuals, to aid 
the reader in understanding why individuals subjected to 
familial DNA testing feel that their privacy is invaded. 
1. Mechanics of DNA 
DNA, is genetic material that assists in determining each 
person’s individual characteristics.17 Every person has, on 
average, fifty to one hundred trillion cells, and nearly all of 
these cells contain forty-six chromosomes composed of DNA.18 
Together, these chromosomes make up the genome of each 
individual.19 Specifically, a human genome contains forty-six 
chromosomes which are paired and numbered, one through 
twenty-two, in addition to a sex-determining chromosome of 
 17. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 27–28 (2d ed. 2005) (noting 
the genetic variability in the human population due to DNA); NORAH RUDIN & 
KEITH INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 33 (2d ed. 
2002) (describing the small portion of DNA in humans through which 
individual traits are manifested through). 
 18. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender 
Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 248 248–249 
(2006). 
 19. Id. 
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either two X chromosomes or one X and one Y chromosome.20 
Each individual receives from their parent a parental genome, 
comprised of one of the twenty-two pairs of chromosomes and 
one of the sex chromosomes.21 This parental genome consists of 
approximately 3.2 billion base pairs of DNA, and each base pair 
serves as one rung of the DNA molecule.22 Thus, an 
individual’s complete chromosomal package is a blend of one-
half of the mother’s chromosomes and one-half of the father’s 
chromosomes.23 
To further understand the human genome, it is important 
to note that chromosomes are comprised of billions of base pairs 
of DNA.24 These base pairs are created by the pairing of two 
out of four nucleotides.25 The pairing of nucleotides is a very 
specific process: adenine (A) pairs with thymine (T) and 
guanine (G) pairs with cytosine (C).26 After pairing up, the 
nucleotides then form a sequence of A-T, T-A, G-C, and C-G 
pairs.27 This phenomenon, known as genetic sequencing, 
creates the genes that determine everything from an 
individual’s hair color to her height.28 
The human genome contains both coding and non-coding 
genes. Approximately three percent of the genome is 
programmed to code for ribonucleic acid (RNA), while about 
four percent is programmed to code for other important, but so 
far unknown, functions.29 The remaining ninety-three percent 
of the genome contains non-coding genes that appear to serve 
no known function.30 The non-coding genes are comprised of a 
series of short tandem repeats (STRs) in which stretches of 
varying numbers and copies of genetic sequences appear.31 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; see also Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A 
Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 7 
(2010). 
 25. Greely, et al., supra note 18, at 249. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id.; See also Gabel, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that genes define traits 
like eye color and shoe size). 
 29. Greely, et al., supra note 18, at 249. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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Each stretch of varying repeats forms a different allele.32 Each 
of these alleles occupies a fixed locus—a specific location—on a 
particular chromosome.33 This fixed location allows the alleles 
to serve as genetic markers.34 These genetic markers are the 
key to using DNA as a means of identification.35 
2. DNA as a Tool for Identification 
Humans are 99.9 percent identical—leaving only 0.1 
percent of DNA to differentiate every member of society.36 To 
date, scientists believe that ninety-three percent of the human 
genome serves no function other than playing a structural role 
in the physical activity of the chromosome.37 It is these non-
coding regions of DNA, also known as “junk” DNA, that store 
the genetic information used to identify matches.38 
Presently, DNA cannot be used to identify any particular 
individual.39 Instead, STRs are used as a means of comparing 
whether one sample of DNA is from the same source as another 
sample of DNA. STRs are located on a fixed point on a 
chromosome; the locus of an STR is thus an identifiable 
quantity that can be used as a marker from which a 
comparison can be drawn against the STRs of other 
individuals.40 DNA is not, therefore, used as a means of 
identifying one specific person, but rather as a way to compare 
whether one DNA sample came from the same individual as 
another DNA sample. 
The sequence of STR alleles is not unique to every 
individual, despite varying heavily from person to person.41 As 
a result, it is necessary for multiple STR alleles to be analyzed 
 32. Id. at 250.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. LAWRENCE F. KOBLINSKY ET AL., DNA: FORENSIC AND LEGAL 
APPLICATIONS 17 (2004). 
 37. Greely, et al., supra note 18, at 249. 
 38. Id. Gabel, supra note 24, at 8–9. 
 39. Crime labs can, however, identify whether a particular DNA sample 
came from a male or female. They accomplish this by testing for amelogenin, 
another genetic marker, which presents itself in two different lengths in 
males, and only one length in females. This allows investigators to determine 
the sex of an individual whose DNA has been collected. BUTLER, supra note 
17, at 113–15. 
 40. Gabel, supra note 24, at 10. 
 41. Id. 
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as a means of increasing accuracy. Typically, crime labs in the 
United States use thirteen STR markers (CODIS markers) 
situated over twelve chromosomes.42 By analyzing these 
thirteen alleles, crime labs greatly reduce the risk of 
discovering a false match. Specifically, “[t]he odds that an 
unrelated person shares the same set of thirteen pairs are 
normally infinitesimal–—at most one in several hundred 
billion, compared with a total of 6.3 billion living humans.”43 
On average, two random Americans share about two or three 
alleles.44 By comparing thirteen alleles, it is thus extremely 
unlikely that a false match would be identified. 
B. DNA COLLECTION AND STORAGE: CODIS 
Once the DNA of an individual has been collected for 
analysis, it is run through the national DNA database. In order 
to understand the privacy concerns individuals have regarding 
the effects of storing individual DNA in a national database, it 
is important to first understand the history and mechanics of 
the United States’ national DNA database, the Combine DNA 
Index System (CODIS). In Part II.B.I, a brief overview of the 
history of CODIS is provided. Then, Part II.B.2 provides an 
overview of how CODIS aids law enforcement officials in using 
DNA as an identifier. Finally, Part II.B.3 discusses particular 
advantages and concerns that individuals have expressed in 
response to the CODIS system. 
1. History of CODIS 
The CODIS program was created in 1990 by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a pilot program in crime-
solving.45 CODIS operates on three levels: national, state, and 
local, with each lower-tier communicating with the higher-
tier.46 The national program, the National Data Index System 
(NDIS) was created by the DNA Identification Act of 1994.47 
 42. Id. at 11. 
 43. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 250. 
 44. Id. 
 45. CODIS Brochure, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis_brochure (last visited Mar. 27, 
2011). 
 46. See id. (describing the CODIS architecture as consisting of federal, 
state, and local systems). 
 47. The DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
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The Act not only established a national DNA database, but also 
dictated the indexes that may be created, and defined 
requirements for participating laboratories regarding quality 
assurance, privacy, and expungement.48 There are several 
indexes that are entered into CODIS: convicted offender, 
forensic, arrestees, missing persons, unidentified human 
remains, and biological relatives of missing persons.49 The 
DNA collected for each of these indexes is stored and available 
to any approved law enforcement agency. 
DNA is present in nearly every cell in the human body, 
including blood, semen, teeth, hair, saliva, perspiration, nails, 
urine, skin cells, and tissue.50 Additionally, DNA can be 
forensically useful for decades, though heat, mold, bacteria, 
moisture, sunlight, and other environmental factors can 
deteriorate the DNA, rendering it unusable.51 As a result of the 
many different ways DNA can appear at a crime scene, 
investigators often have little trouble finding the genetic 
fingerprint, making it a practical and ideal tool in crime 
investigation.52 As technological advancements emerged 
surrounding DNA’s utility, it became necessary to create a 
method of storing the collected samples. With this background 
in mind, CODIS was created. 
2. Mechanics of CODIS 
CODIS functions as a DNA matchmaker. Once a DNA 
sample is recovered from a crime scene, the information is 
stored in the forensic index.53 This information is then run 
against the DNA samples in the offender index, which have 
been collected from individuals convicted of a crime, and in 
some states, individuals who have been arrested.54 The person 
2065–71 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 48. Id. 
 49. CODIS Brochure, supra note 45. 
 50. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER SHOULD 
KNOW ABOUT DNA (1999). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Thirty-four states have adopted an “all-felony” policy, in which only 
felons are required to submit DNA samples. At least thirty-eight states also 
include some misdemeanors in their list of qualifying offenses. Additionally, 
four states—California, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia—permit the DNA from 
arrestees to be taken. Seth Axelrad, Survey of State DNA Database Statutes, 
AM. SOC’Y OF L. MED. & ETHICS, http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/guide.pdf 
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conducting the search specifies whether they would like a high, 
medium, or low stringency search.55 A high stringency search 
means that all thirteen alleles from the two samples being 
compared must match.56 A medium or moderate stringency 
match is specifically dictated by the searcher, who may define 
exactly how many allele matches they would like.57 Finally, a 
low stringency search will return matches in which at least one 
allele is similar.58 The results of moderate and low stringency 
searches are called partial matches, while the result of a high 
stringency search is designated a full match.59 
A partial match surfaces in two ways. The first is by 
running a degraded sample of DNA against the offender index 
in the hopes of getting a “cold hit.”60 The second is by running a 
full forensic sample against the offender index in search of a 
sample that has some, but not all, of the alleles in common.61 
In the event a partial match is found, the identity of the 
matched person is not considered a suspect, but rather a 
pivot.62 A pivot “functions as a genetic beacon who may point 
the way to the actual source, someone who shares a similar 
profile with the pivot—a family member.”63 After finding either 
the identity of a cold hit, or a pivot, the law enforcement officer 
is able to proceed with the investigation armed with a starting 
place for their questioning. It is in this fashion that CODIS 
facilitates familial DNA testing. 
3. CODIS Advantages and Concerns 
The advantages of the CODIS program are undeniable. 
Since August 2010, CODIS has aided in more than 121,900 
investigations by producing more than 124,800 hits.64 This 
(last accessed Oct. 20, 2010); see also John D. Biancamano, Note, Arresting 
DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and their Fourth 
Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 626–29 (2009) (summarizing 
state statutes regarding DNA sampling coverage). 
 55. Gabel, supra note 24, at 17. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 17–18. 
 61. Id. at 18. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. CODIS—NDIS Statistics Clickable Map, FED. BUREAU OF 
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provides investigators with not only the ability to solve crimes, 
thus aiding society by keeping it safe, but by also clearing 
suspects of crimes they did not commit.65 Additionally, the 
CODIS system’s ability to identify victims’ remains is 
unparalleled.66 Without the use of CODIS many family 
members would be unaware that their missing child, parent, or 
sibling’s remains were in police custody as unidentifiable. 
Despite the advantages, critics of the CODIS system have 
suggested that storing such personal information in a database 
is destined to end in a breach of privacy.67 Although the 
information stored in the national database of DNA contains no 
identifiable information (only the DNA profile, the agency 
identifier, a specimen identification number, and the name of 
one DNA laboratory personnel associated with the DNA 
analysis are stored in DNA databases),68 critics assert that if 
DNA is contained on the database, it would become possible to 
identify a certain individual’s propensity to disease, illness, or 
addictions.69 As a result, critics fear that maintaining the DNA 
of individuals in a nationwide database may lead to severe 
abuse of the system. 
C. FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING 
When a DNA sample is entered into the CODIS system the 
ideal situation is for an exact match to be identified. An exact 
DNA match provides the identity of the DNA source, thus 
providing investigators with a solid lead for their 
investigation.70 However, most often the investigator is 
provided with a sample that returns no exact matches. When 
INVESTIGATION, http://www2.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2010). 
 65. The Innocence Project has used DNA testing to exonerate more than 
250 people in 34 states since 1989.  About Us: FAQs, THE INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/How_many_people_have_been_exone
rated_through_DNA_testing.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 66. See CODIS Brochure, supra note 45(noting that identifying missing 
persons is a priority of the CODIS program). 
 67. See, e.g., Gabel, supra  note 24, at 48–52 (noting the risks of storing 
genetic information in DNA databases, including data security and privacy 
concerns). 
 68. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 250. 
 69. Lina Alexandra Hogan, Fourth Amendment—Guilt by Relation: If 
Your Brother is Convicted of a Crime, You Too May Do Time, 30 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 543, 550 (2008). 
 70. Gabel, supra note 24, at 17. . 
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this situation presents itself, another, more controversial, 
option is to run the DNA through the CODIS system in search 
of a partial match. 
In contrast to an exact DNA match, which identifies the 
source of the DNA, a partial match may indicate that the two 
sources are related biologically.71 When searching for a partial 
match, investigators specify exactly how many allele matches 
they would like CODIS to return. Typically, “identical twins 
will share all thirteen pairs—and first degree relatives (parent, 
sibling, or child) on average will share at least half.”72 Second 
degree relatives, such as uncles, aunts, grandparents, nieces, 
nephews, and half-siblings will share only one quarter of their 
DNA.73 Armed with this information, investigators seek partial 
matches and then use the results to question those individuals 
with the greatest likelihood of being related to the original 
DNA source.74 
D. CURRENT STATUS OF STATE DNA SEARCHING LEGISLATION 
In 2002 the first familial database search was conducted in 
the U.K., leading investigators to the son of Joseph Kappen—a 
serial rapist from the 1970s.75 Since this time U.S. states have 
individually attempted to define whether familial searching is 
permissible within their jurisdictions. Most states have left 
their policies on partial match reporting and familial searching 
unwritten.76 This lack of transparency makes it difficult to 
 71. States Using Familial Searches, DNAFORENSICS.COM, 
http://dnaforensics.com/statesandfamilialsearches.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 
2011). 
 72. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 250. 
 73. Id. at 252. 
 74. Despite efforts at conducting as high stringency test as possible, false 
positives will occur. A 2008 study found that this was true even when allelic 
rarity was considered. See Thomas Reid et al., Use of Sibling Pairs to 
Determine the Familial Searching Efficiency of Forensic Databases, 2 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 340, 341 (2008). 
 75. Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and 
Intrusiveness: Issues in the Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of 
Criminal Investigations, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 545, 554 (2005). Investigators 
ran DNA through a familial search, turning up the son of Joseph Kappen. 
Though Kappen was dead, the family provided investigators with permission 
to exhume his body. The DNA taken from this procedure proved Kappen’s 
guilt, allowing victims and their families to finally know the truth about what 
happened. 
 76. Natalie Ram, DNA Confidential, SCIENCE PROGRESS, (Nov. 2, 2009), 
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determine which law enforcement agencies use familial 
searching.77 Maryland is currently the only state to ban 
familial searching outright.78 
Only four states have expressly approved the use of 
familial searching.79 In 2009, Colorado issued a DNA Familial 
Search Policy, which authorizes the release of partial matches 
and use of familial DNA searching.80 Similarly, California 
released an information bulletin outlining procedures that 
must be followed when conducting and utilizing familial DNA 
searches.81 Both New York and Virginia have passed 
legislation giving law enforcement authority to perform partial 
DNA searches.82 In addition, other states have permitted 
familial DNA searches in practice, but have not codified or 
regulated their use..83 
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/11/dna-confidential. 
 77. Familial DNA Searches, FINDLAW, 
http://criminal.findlaw.com/crimes/criminal_rights/your-rights-search-and-
seizure/familial-dna-search.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
 78. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (LexisNexis 2008) (“A person 
may not perform a search of the statewide DNA data base for the purpose of 
identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which the offender 
may be a biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was 
acquired.”). 
 79. California, Colorado, New York, and Florida. States Using Familial 
Searches, supra note 71; see also Lauren Keiper, More States Use Familial 
DNA As Powerful Forensic Search Tool, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2011, 8:36 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/31/us-crime-dna-familial-
idUSTRE72T2QS20110331. 
 80. COLO. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DNA FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY 
(2009), available at 
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Familial_DNA/CBI%20DNA%20Fa
milial%20Search%20Policy%20Oct%202009%20-%20Signed.pdf (detailing that 
family members should not be questioned until a suspect has been isolated 
using traditional detective work and the public records have been checked to 
verify that a familial relationship exists in fact). 
 81. Information Bulletin from Lance Gima, Bureau of Forensic Services, 
to All California Law Enforcement Agencies and District Attorneys Offices, on 
DNA Partial Match (Crime Scene DNA Profile to Offender) Policy, Bureau of 
Forensic Servs., (1999), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1548_08-bfs-01.pdf (stating that 
a DNA partial match results when at least fifteen STR alleles match). 
 82. States Using Familial Searches, supra note 71; Keiper, supra note 79. 
 83. States Using Familial Searches, supra note 71 (noting that Florida 
has conducted familial DNA searches by running the DNA of children born to 
rape victims through CODIS as a means of identifying the child’s father). 
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E. SURVIVING CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER: DNA TESTING VS. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The constitutionality of familial DNA testing has yet to be 
addressed by courts. However, DNA testing and the CODIS 
system have been the object of a great deal of litigation since 
the 1980s. The most litigated aspect of DNA testing involves 
the Fourth Amendment.84 Challengers of DNA testing argue 
that mandatory DNA sampling amounts to an unreasonable 
search and seizure, thus violating the Fourth Amendment.85 In 
this regard, the United States Supreme Court has consistently 
held that an extraction and analysis of a biological sample is a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.86 Having established 
that DNA extraction is a search, courts must subsequently 
address whether extraction amounts to an unreasonable 
seizure, which is a seizure that is absent probable cause.87 
The Fourth Amendment requires that probable cause exist 
when conducting a search and seizure.88 However, courts have 
carved out two exceptions to circumvent the probable cause 
requirement. The first is to analyze the situation under the 
“totality of the circumstances test,” or the balancing test.89 The 
 84. The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 85. Other challenges against mandatory DNA testing have been brought 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Eight 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Due Process 
Clause, and on grounds of separation of powers. Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra 
Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law 
Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 146–51 (2001). 
 86. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001) 
(holding that the analysis of a urine sample was a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) 
(holding that taking and testing an individual’s blood are two separate 
intrusions on an individual’s expectation of privacy); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 
753, 767 (1985) (holding that the forced extraction of a bullet from a 
defendant’s body constituted a search); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
770 (1966) (holding that taking a blood sample was an intrusion on an 
individual’s right to privacy). 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848–57 (2006) (using the 
totality of the circumstances test); United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 7–9 
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second is to analyze the case under the “special needs test.”90 
Part II.E.1 of this Note examines the way courts have treated 
the totality of the circumstances test in the past. This is 
followed in Part II.E.2 by an examination of the way courts in 
the past have treated the special needs test. 
1. The Totality of the Circumstances Test 
The totality of the circumstances test is a form of a 
balancing test that the majority of courts have employed when 
upholding the constitutionality of the DNA Act. Under this test, 
“[t]he touchstone of . . . analysis under the Fourth Amendment 
is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the 
particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal 
security.”91 Thus, under a totality of the circumstances test, the 
court balances the intrusion to the individual against the 
interests of society as a whole.92 
The totality of circumstances test was most notably applied 
in United States v. Kincade93 to uphold the constitutionality of 
mandatory DNA extraction. The defendant, released on parole, 
argued that he should not be required to submit to a mandatory 
DNA test absent suspicion that he had committed another 
crime in violation of his parole.94 The court reasoned that as a 
parolee, the defendant was subject to a lesser degree of privacy 
than ordinary citizens, and that society’s interest in his 
following the conditions of his parole outweighed any intrusion 
of privacy he might experience.95 Similarly, the totality of 
(1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(finding the totality of the circumstances test more applicable than the special 
needs test); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (using a 
balancing of the interests test); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 
(3d Cir. 2005) (analyzing Fourth Amendment violation under the totality of 
the circumstances test). 
 90. See United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding 
that probationers can be subject to suspicion-less searches based on the special 
needs test); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that DNA extraction should be evaluated under the special needs test); United 
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that forced 
DNA extraction is based on the special needs test because DNA profiling 
exceeds general law enforcement needs). 
 91. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 93. Id. at 821. 
 94. Id. at 816. 
 95. Id. at 838–39. 
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circumstances test was utilized in United States v. Weikert to 
uphold the mandatory DNA extraction of an individual 
released from prison on a supervised probation period.96 In that 
case, the court reasoned that the government’s interests 
outweighed the privacy interests of Weikert: 
[T]he government’s important interests in monitoring and 
rehabilitating supervised releasees, solving crimes, and exonerating 
innocent individuals outweigh Weikert’s privacy interests, given his 
status as a supervised releasee, the relatively minimal inconvenience 
occasioned by a blood draw, and the coding of genetic information 
that, by statute, may be used only for purposes of identification.97 
In sum, courts have held that DNA testing passes 
constitutional muster under the totality of the circumstances 
test when the greater good of society outweighs any invasion of 
privacy. 
2. The “Special Needs Test” 
A minority of courts have justified the warrantless forced 
collection of DNA using the “special needs test.” The special 
needs test was developed as a means of legitimizing a search 
when there was no warrant, probable cause, or suspicion of 
individual wrongdoing.98 The foundation of the special needs 
test is that law enforcement officials need to be able to balance 
an “individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal 
security” with “the government’s need for effective methods to 
deal with breaches of public order.”99 There are two prongs that 
must be satisfied under the special needs test: first, one must 
show that there is a special need for the search;100 second, 
officials must show that there is a need “beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement.”101 Consequently, courts have 
permitted warrantless searches in situations where a special 
need beyond normal detective work can be demonstrated. 
Illinois v. Lidster provides one example where the Court 
found a warrantless search permissible.102 In Lidster, police 
positioned a checkpoint on a freeway in response to a hit and 
 96. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 97. Id. at 14. 
 98. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351–52 (1985) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 99. Id. at 337. 
 100. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000). 
 101. Id. at 37. 
 102. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
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run accident.103 The purpose of the checkpoint was to question 
anyone who may have any information about the accident.104 
During one of the stops Robert Lidster, while intoxicated, 
almost hit an officer.105 In his defense, Lidster posited that the 
stop was an illegal search and seizure.106 In validating the 
search and seizure, the Court reasoned that “the law ordinarily 
permits police to seek the voluntary cooperation of members of 
the public in the investigation of a crime . . . voluntary requests 
play a vital role in police investigatory work.”107 In light of the 
fact that traditional methods of investigation such as probable 
cause and warrants are not always practical, the Court 
recognized that at times society is best served by a need for 
greater flexibility. 
Lower courts have employed the special needs test utilized 
by the Supreme Court in Lidster to justify DNA extraction. In 
Nicholas v. Goord, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the mandatory extraction of DNA, noting that the government’s 
special need was to create a DNA-indexing database to aid in 
solving crimes.108 Similarly, in United States v. Conley, the 
Sixth Circuit found that mandatory DNA testing was 
constitutional because the government had a special need to 
obtain reliable identifying information, reduce recidivism, and 
protect communities.109 
While courts have had success utilizing the special needs 
test as a means of negating the need for probable cause, the 
primary purpose prong (which requires a showing that DNA 
extraction is needed for a purpose beyond regular detective 
work) is the most difficult to prove.110 However, needs such as 
 103. Id. at 422. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 425 (internal citations omitted). 
 108. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 669 (2d Cir. 2005). See also Green v. 
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (permitting mandatory DNA 
extraction based on the special need of creating a reliable identification 
database from which past and future crimes could be solved); United States v. 
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding that creating a DNA-
indexing database was a permissible special need). 
 109. United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 2007).  See also 
Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (justifying DNA extraction by 
concluding the need to reduce and prevent recidivism was a special need). 
 110. A majority of courts have utilized the “totality of the circumstances 
test” to uphold DNA testing specifically because it is so difficult to satisfy the 
“primary purpose” prong. See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 22–23 (1st 
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obtaining reliable identification, protecting communities, 
assisting in solving past and future crimes, creating a DNA-
indexing database, and reducing and preventing recidivism 
have all been cited by courts as a means of getting around the 
primary purpose prong of the special needs test.111 Further, 
courts have found that the special needs test is most applicable 
when the search is done for the purpose of acquiring 
information, rather than looking for evidence of general 
criminal wrongdoing.112 
To date, no courts have addressed whether familial DNA 
testing is constitutional. However, as technology advances and 
familial DNA testing is incorporated into crime-solving 
techniques, courts will undoubtedly be called upon to evaluate 
whether familial DNA testing is an unreasonable search and 
seizure of innocent parties. This Note analyzes familial DNA 
testing under the totality of circumstances test and then 
applies the special needs test to familial DNA testing. 
Ultimately, this Note concludes that familial DNA testing is 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment under both the 
totality of the circumstances test and the special needs test. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED: FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHES AND 
THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 
The totality of circumstances exception to the probable 
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment permits courts to 
apply a balancing test weighing the intrusion to the individual 
against the interests of society as a whole.113 There are many 
considerations that must be taken into account when 
determining whether releasing the identity of a partial DNA 
match is an invasion of privacy. In what follows, Part III.A.1 of 
this note addresses the interests of the government and society 
with regard to familial DNA testing. Part III.A.2 addresses the 
Cir. 2007) (arguing that while the government boasts non-law enforcement 
objectives, the DNA Act was primarily enacted to aid law enforcement and 
“[t]hus, the centrality of law enforcement objectives to the DNA Act buttresses 
[the] conclusion that the totality of the circumstances analysis, rather than 
the special needs analysis, is appropriate”). 
 111. See cases cited supra notes 108–109. 
 112. See Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 668. 
 113. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 827–28 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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privacy interests at stake for individuals. Finally, Part III.A.3 
weighs these interests against each other, ultimately 
concluding that familial DNA testing is permissible under the 
totality of the circumstances exception of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
1. It Matters to Me: Society’s Interest in Familial DNA 
Testing 
Society benefits from the use of familial DNA testing in 
many ways. First, the use of identifying partial DNA matches 
in investigations can serve to deter crime. The way the system 
currently works is that an individual’s DNA is in CODIS if he 
or she has been arrested or convicted of a crime.114 In this 
respect, DNA testing is proven to have a specific deterrence 
effect because “offenders are keenly aware that DNA assists 
tremendously in solving crimes and in prosecuting suspects.”115 
However, the current CODIS system does not provide 
detectives with access to the DNA of first time offenders. 
Consequently, in order to obtain the DNA of a first time 
offender suspected of committing a crime, the individual would 
have to voluntarily release the sample, or the police would have 
to approach the individual with a warrant and collect it. Absent 
a warrant or voluntary submission, the police have no way to 
connect the DNA left at a crime scene to an individual who has 
not previously been convicted of a crime.116 Thus, though DNA 
is a valuable tool in preventing recidivism, as the law currently 
stands, it is not as helpful in deterring first-time offenders. 
First-time offenders would more likely be deterred if it was 
common knowledge that partial DNA matches are permitted.117 
Individuals who themselves have not committed a crime but 
have a family member who has done so would be more easily 
 114. Gabel, supra note 28, at 14. See also supra text accompanying notes 
45–49. 
 115. AVINASH BHATI, JUST. POL’Y CTR., QUANTIFYING THE SPECIFIC 
DETERRENCE EFFECTS OF DNA DATABASES 55–56 (2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412058_dna_databases.pdf (finding that 
DNA databases increase crime deterrence rates 2-3% and increase probative 
crime deterrence 20-30%). 
 116. It is also possible police would have access to the DNA of those who 
were a missing persons at one time, or who had been arrested in the few states 
that permit storing the DNA of arrestees. 
 117. See generally Williams & Johnson, supra note 75, at 546 (suggesting 
that DNA databases serve as a deterrent to potential criminal offenders). 
 868 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:2 
 
                                                          
 
identified through the use of familial DNA testing.118 
Therefore, if an individual is considering whether or not to 
commit a crime, she would also have to consider that her 
previously convicted family members’ DNA may lead to her 
capture. While this method may not deter crimes that happen 
in the heat of the moment, it could prevent crimes that are 
carefully planned out. Therefore, permitting law enforcement 
officials to utilize partial match DNA tests could prevent a 
number of first time offenders from joining the criminal ranks. 
Another profound advantage weighing in society’s favor is 
the increased rate of accuracy in identifying suspects.119 
Through the use of familial DNA testing, law enforcement 
officials could more confidently identify suspects than they 
currently are able to using traditional methods. That is, by 
identifying individuals who are related to the criminal, the 
suspect pool is quickly narrowed.120 Through the use of DNA 
police officers are more easily able to identify exactly who they 
should, and who they should not be questioning.121 The 
advantage here is that individuals who are more likely to be 
found guilty are focused on, while individuals who are not 
likely to be guilty are not subjected to the stressful 
investigation process. 
An additional benefit to society is the potential cost and 
time savings.122 Police investigation is a time consuming, 
expensive process. Law enforcement officials have to identify 
everyone with any possible information related to the crime, 
locate them, question them, piece all of their stories together, 
and then evaluate who the lead suspects are. They then spend 
hours, days, or weeks searching for the case-breaking 
information needed to positively identify the actual criminal. 
However, the use of DNA technology speeds this process up. By 
quickly running DNA found at the crime scene, police can 
 118. Id. at 554. 
 119. See id at 546. (noting that DNA testing would allow law enforcement 
officials the “ability to confidently eliminate innocent suspects from 
investigations” and increase the likelihood of “generating reliable and 
persuasive evidence for use in court”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See generally id. (noting that “the potential to make speedy and robust 
suspected offender identifications through automated profile comparisons in 
[centralized] criminal justice databases” and “a reduction in the cost of many 
investigations” make DNA testing beneficial). 
 2011] IT’S ALL RELATIVE 869 
                                                          
identify exactly who was at the crime scene. This information 
can be obtained for about fifty to a hundred dollars a test, and 
takes about ten minutes to process.123 As a result, using DNA 
tests can save law enforcement officials hundreds of hours of 
time,124 as well as save taxpayers’ money since police officers 
will not have to be compensated for those wasted hours spent 
questioning people who end up being unhelpful in solving the 
case. In one Denver study on the impact of DNA testing on 
property crimes, it was found that “[a]ctual two year savings to 
the citizens and the City of Denver [was] more than $5 million 
in police costs and $36.8 million in property loss. . ..”125 If 
familial DNA testing is added to the list of investigative tools 
law enforcement officials are permitted to utilize, the money 
and time saved will likely increase dramatically. By expanding 
the DNA testing policies to include familial DNA testing, police 
will be better able to quickly narrow their investigation, 
creating a more cost-effective and efficient police force. 
  One final benefit familial DNA testing would provide 
society is to boost public confidence in the justice system.126 
DNA testing is an extremely effective crime-solving tool, 
meaning that the expansion of it would increase its 
effectiveness. The use of DNA testing will allow society to feel 
safer due to the immense accuracy DNA testing provides in 
identifying the perpetrator.127 Additionally, offenders convicted 
 123. Howard Safir & Peter Reinharz, DNA Testing: The Next Big Crime-
Busting Breakthrough, CITY J., Winter 2007, at 49, 52. 
 124. DAVID LAZER, SEARCHING THE FAMILY TREE FOR SUSPECTS: ETHICAL 
AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES IN THE FAMILIAL SEARCHING OF DNA 
DATABASES 2 (Mar. 2008), available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-
programs/centers/taubman/policybriefs/lazer_final.pdf (“Given that the total 
number of investigations aided from the database system to date in the US 
[sic] exceeds 60,000, it is plausible that the widespread use of familial 
searching could produce many thousands of useful leads almost overnight, just 
based on the data already in the offender and crime scene databases.”). 
 125. SIMON ASHIKHMIN ET AL., DENVER DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
EFFECTIVENESS AND COST EFFICIENCY OF DNA EVIDENCE IN VOLUME CRIME: 
DENVER COLORADO SITE SUMMARY 10 (2008), 
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/DNABurgrCostEfficiencyReserch1.
pdf (“The return on investment on every dollar spent with this system is 
estimated to be $90.”). 
 126. Williams & Johnson, supra note 75, at 546 (suggesting that DNA 
testing may increase “public confidence in policing and in the wider judicial 
process”). 
 127. See id.; see also BHATI, supra note 115, at ix (noting the conviction of 
guilty offenders and exoneration of the wrongfully convicted from increased 
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using DNA testing are typically given longer sentences, thus 
keeping criminals off the streets longer.128 If familial DNA 
testing is permitted, individuals convicted of crimes are more 
likely to be apprehended because the investigative lead pool 
would be expanded.129 Accordingly, society would find comfort 
in knowing that there is another reliable, successful tool out 
there that can be used to positively identify criminals. 
2. It’s None of Your Business: Individual’s Privacy Concerns 
One concern individuals face when considering familial 
DNA testing is that previously unknown genetic relationships 
may come to light. That is, people fear long lost biological 
siblings will be identified, or that individuals who believed they 
were biologically related to their family will discover they are, 
in fact, not biologically related.130 Some fear that if this 
information came out it would cause many problems within 
their family.131 Additionally, this information would be known 
to the police officers and detectives who ran the investigation, 
and in some circumstances this can be very embarrassing. If 
the law officials know the family, there may be issues of 
confidentiality.132 Personal family secrets may become the 
subject of public gossip.133 Thus, individuals have concerns that 
their family secrets will be on display in the event familial 
DNA testing is permitted. 
Another concern that individuals who oppose familial DNA 
testing have is that familial DNA testing will lead investigators 
to the wrong doors to ask for unnecessarily revealing 
information. Critics fear that if familial DNA testing is 
use of DNA evidence). 
 128. ASHIKHMIN ET AL., supra note 125, at 10 (“The presence of DNA 
evidence results in a 10-fold increase in the average sentence time for 
residential burglars and a 27-fold increase for commercial burglars. (13.9 
years with DNA compared to 1.4 years in traditionally investigated cases in 
residential burglaries, and accordingly 4.6 years to 2 months in commercial 
burglaries).”). 
 129. LAZER, supra note 124, at 2 (conservatively estimating that 
investigative leads produced by the DNA database system could be increased 
by 40% if familial searching was permitted). 
 130. Cf. Williams & Johnson, supra note 75, at 556. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. (discussing how “[o]ther members of their household, their 
wider kin groups and the communities in which they live, may or may not be 
party to that knowledge”). 
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permitted, individuals will unfairly be the subject of police 
investigations.134 Specifically, critics note that if familial DNA 
testing is permitted, then minorities will be disproportionately 
affected.135 As a result, critics argue that it is an unwarranted 
search and seizure and, as such, unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.136 
3. Survival of the Fittest: Society’s Interests are Greater than 
the Individual’s Interest 
Although there may be legitimate individual privacy 
concerns, when viewed in totality, the interests of society are 
greater than that of the individual. While individuals have an 
interest in assuring that their family secrets remain secrets, 
the use of familial DNA testing will not likely serve to bring 
these secrets to light. As it stands now, the DNA that is stored 
in CODIS cannot conclusively prove that one individual is or is 
not related to another person.137 As a result, the system is used 
to suggest individuals who may be related, so that law 
enforcement officials have a starting point in their 
investigation. Therefore, the fear of familial secret being 
exposed is minimal. 
Another concern raised is that individual’s privacy will be 
invaded by overly intrusive law enforcement officials.138 While 
it is true that some lines of questioning witnesses, victims, 
suspects, and others endure may seem intrusive, questioning a 
citizen based on the results of a familial DNA test is no more 
intrusive than that permitted by traditional detective work.139 
 134. Hogan, supra note 69, at 577–79 (fearing that expanding the use of 
DNA technology will subject citizens to “arbitrary government intrusions”). 
 135. Cf. Daniel J. Grimm, The Demographics of Genetic Surveillance: 
Familial DNA Testing and the Hispanic Community, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1164, 1166 (2007) (arguing that the Hispanic community would be 
disproportionately affected by familial DNA testing). 
 136. Hogan, supra note 69, at 582–85 (opining that familial DNA searches 
violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 137. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 250. 
 138. Hogan, supra note 69, at 577–79. 
 139. Critics Challenge Familial DNA Testing (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 
28, 2007) [hereinafter NPR], available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7641971 (Ms. Tania 
Simoncelli: “Denver DA Mitch Morrissey says police always have and always 
will questions people who turn out to be innocent. He likens a partial DNA hit 
to having an eyewitness who caught only half the license plate on a getaway 
car.” Mr. Morrissey: “I think people would be outraged if the police just said 
oh, it’s only a partial plate, so we’re not going to follow this up. The nature of 
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Traditional investigative means require that police officers go 
out and ask individuals questions. This means that with or 
without familial DNA testing many individuals are subject to 
questioning. What is important to note is that familial DNA 
testing does not result in persons with partial matches being 
considered suspects. Instead, when a partial match is 
identified, it is assumed that person is related to the 
perpetrator, but is not the perpetrator. As a result, police 
question that individual as a means of catching the 
perpetrator. This is no different than traditional field work. 
Additionally, the same precautions that are in place now to 
protect citizens against unnecessary police intrusion would 
remain in effect. An individual can refuse to answer the police 
officers questions should she chose to do so. 
Further, while it is a justifiable fear that access to one’s 
genetic predispositions could spell harm to individuals ranging 
in the form of higher health insurance premiums to failing to 
be hired for a job, the genetic information that is obtained 
through DNA testing is currently considered useless.140 DNA 
tests are based on “junk DNA” that provide individuals looking 
at the test with no useful genetic information about the 
individual.141 Thus, concerns about police having access to 
private genetic information are currently unfounded, as there 
is no useful information to be found.142 
Finally, critics’ concern that a disproportionate amount of 
minorities would be subject to investigation is genuine. African 
Americans, who only make up thirteen percent of the general 
population, comprise forty percent of convicted felons.143 As a 
result, the DNA of minorities is overrepresented in CODIS, 
making minority families more likely to be identified in a 
familial DNA search.144 What critics fail to acknowledge is that 
police work is you have to talk to a lot of people.”). 
 140. Gabel, supra note 24, at 46 (“The CODIS markers are thought to hold 
no diagnostic information; their sole value lies in their use as identification 
tools.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. In the future, it may be discovered that what is now considered “junk 
DNA” may provide discoverable genetic information about the individuals. Id. 
While this is beyond the scope of this paper, in the event this proves true, 
procedural safeguards could be enacted to ensure that familial samples 
collected are destroyed after their investigative purposes have been exhausted. 
 143. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 258. 
 144. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial 
 2011] IT’S ALL RELATIVE 873 
                                                          
despite the fact that more minorities will be identified through 
a familial DNA search, it is nonetheless an accurate crime 
fighting tool. Further, the intrusion is not any more invasive 
than would be if traditional detective work had been utilized to 
identify the subject. Traditional investigative work often 
involves questioning the family members of suspects. As a 
result of this investigative method, and the fact that minorities 
are disproportionately convicted of crimes, minority families 
are already targeted for questioning disproportionately. 
Consequently, familial DNA testing would not result in any 
more of an invasion of the privacy of minority families than the 
use of traditional detective work. 
When weighing the benefits to society against the invasion 
of an individual’s privacy interests, society’s interests 
ultimately overrule those of the individual. Considering the 
substantial benefits society derives from the implementation of 
familial DNA testing, including saving time, money, deterring 
crime, and boosting the public’s confidence in the justice 
system, the minimal invasion of an individual’s privacy is 
justified. 
B. IN THE NAME OF THE LAW: THERE IS A SPECIAL NEED 
JUSTIFYING FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHES 
There are many identifiable special needs when justifying 
the utility of familial DNA searches. One is the special need to 
identify and prosecute criminals so as to keep society safe. 
Studies have shown that DNA testing provides a means of 
prosecution in far more instances than traditional detective 
work.145 For example, one study conducted in Denver found 
that of four-hundred burglaries in which DNA was left behind, 
over seventy-six percent of them were prosecuted based on the 
DNA, and would not have been prosecuted were it not for the 
DNA.146 The study found that the “use of DNA evidence results 
in an almost 5.5-fold increase in the rate of case 
prosecution.”147 The government’s ability to keep the public 
safe is one that cannot be taken lightly. It is clear that law 
enforcement agencies, and the public in general, have a special 
Searching, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 309, 370 (2010) (citing estimate that more 
than four times the percentage of African Americans (17%) would be identified 
as suspects as compared to Caucasians (4%) with the use of familial searches). 
 145. ASHIKHMIN ET AL., supra note 125, at 4–5. 
 146. Id. at 2. 
 147. Id. at 10. 
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need to use familial DNA searches. The ability to more 
effectively identify and prosecute criminals is one special need 
that can justify using the familial DNA testing. 
The ability to deter crime is another identifiable special 
need that justifies using familial DNA searching. Nationally, 
7.3 million children have one or two parents in jail.148 Of those, 
seventy percent will commit a crime themselves.149 The 
government has a special need to reduce this rate. If children of 
incarcerated parents know that their parents’ DNA can lead 
law enforcement officials to them quickly and accurately, the 
child may refrain from participating in criminal activity. Even 
if only a few thousand of these children are deterred from 
committing a crime, the special needs test remains justified. 
Critics of familial DNA testing argue that while more 
criminals may be caught through the use of familial DNA 
testing, it is still not a justifiable technique.150 “I mean, we 
could put, you know, cameras in everybody’s living rooms and 
say too bad, you know, and you could catch more criminals that 
way, but that’s a bad way of making policy.”151 Critics fear that 
policy makers are taking crime-solving one step too far, and 
unfairly invading the privacy interests of others by acting as a 
“Big Brother.”152 While it is true that some techniques in crime-
solving, such as placing cameras in living rooms are better left 
unexplored, familial DNA testing is not one of them. DNA 
testing is currently a permissible crime-solving tool, making 
familial DNA testing a logical next step. Additionally, the 
accuracy and efficiency familial DNA testing provides to law 
enforcement result in safer streets for society as a whole. This 
need to provide safety for society outweighs any privacy 
invasion individuals may perceive. 
C. PROTECTING PRIVACY 
In an effort to protect the privacy of individuals, while still 
reaping the benefits of familial DNA searching, I propose three 
 148. E. Mosley, Incarcerated- Children of Parents in Prison Impacted, TEX. 
DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST. (July 6–12, 2008), 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/pgm&svcs/gokids/gokids-articles-incarcerated-
children-of-parents-impacted.html. 
 149. Id. 
 150. NPR, supra note 139. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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safeguards on the use of familial DNA searching. First, 
destruction procedures should be carefully outlined so as to 
make sure that once the identity of a DNA match is acquired, 
that the link between the DNA and the identity is destroyed. 
The identity and DNA match is only useful during the actual 
investigation. As a result, once the investigation ends, there is 
no longer a need to have the identity of the partial match in the 
same arena as the DNA. This safeguard will help assuage 
concerns critics have about a government official having control 
of their DNA. 
A second way to properly safeguard familial DNA 
searching is to institute a policy of informed consent. That is, if 
a law enforcement official would like to obtain the DNA of an 
individual in order to conduct a familial DNA search, the 
individual first has to provide consent. This would be useful in 
situations where law enforcement officials have a suspect in 
mind, but have no means of getting a warrant to get that 
individual’s DNA directly. In this situation, the police would be 
able to use a family member’s DNA, but only after obtaining 
her consent in order to determine whether the suspect is 
related to the family member whose DNA was tested. Armed 
with this information, law enforcement officials would be able 
to satisfy the probable cause prong and obtain a warrant to get 
the DNA from the actual suspect. In this scenario, consent 
would serve as a means of protecting individuals from 
incriminating their family members, but would also permit 
individuals who choose so to help take a criminal off the street. 
The final safeguard that law enforcement officials should 
implement is to establish a minimum number of required allele 
matches. Low stringency matches should not be permitted, as 
they are not reliable enough to determine whether an 
individual is related to someone or not.153 Medium stringency 
tests should be the norm, and law enforcement officials should 
be required to use other investigative means to establish a 
relationship between the partial match and the suspect. That 
is, police should not knock on the door of every person who is a 
partial match and ask them if they have a family member who 
may have committed a crime. Instead, they should take the 
identities of the partial matches, evaluate whether they have 
 153. Gabel, supra note 28, at 17 (explaining that a low stringency search is 
only one allele out of a possible twenty-six is found to be in common between 
the compared samples). 
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family members that could potentially have committed the 
crime in question, and then evaluate whether there is any 
other information that ties that suspect to the crime. In cases 
such as this, it may be possible to question the suspect directly 
without ever contacting the individual whose DNA was a 
partial match. 
Implementing these procedural safeguards would help law 
enforcement officials minimize any invasion of citizens’ privacy. 
It would mitigate the fears critics have, while still permitting 
law enforcement officials to conduct an efficient and effective 
investigation. While the suggested safeguards would not fully 
alleviate any intrusion into an individual’s privacy, they would 
help alleviate concerns. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Familial DNA testing presents unchartered waters for the 
courts, but soon enough, the legal challenges will come. As 
discussed in the analysis section, challengers will likely raise a 
variety of legitimate privacy concerns that differentiate familial 
DNA testing from traditional DNA testing. Despite these 
concerns, the benefits familial DNA testing provides to society, 
including increased accuracy in suspect identification, crime 
deterrence, decreases in investigation time, financial savings, 
and increased public confidence in the justice system, support 
the contention that society’s interest outweighs the interest of 
individual’s privacy. The courts’ reluctance to find DNA testing 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment lends credence 
to the idea that the benefits society as a whole gains from the 
swift, inexpensive, accurate method of keeping criminals off the 
street outweigh any small intrusion into individuals’ privacy. 
With a few procedural safeguards, such as destruction 
procedures, an informed consent policy, and a minimum 
required number of allele matches, the concerns opponents of 
familial DNA testing may raise can be mitigated. In light of 
this, familial DNA searching should be permitted in all fifty 
states so as to utilize the technology most effectively to improve 
public safety. 
 
